Ghost Riders Sybil Attacks on Crowdsourced Mobile Mapping Services

Abstract

Real-time crowdsourced maps provide timely updates on traffic, congestion, accidents, and points of interest. In this project it demonstrate how lack of strong location authentication allows creation of software-based Sybil devices that expose crowdsourced map systems to a variety of security and privacy attacks. This experiments show that a single Sybil device with limited resources can cause reporting false congestion and accidents and automatically rerouting user traffic. More importantly, it describe the techniques to generate Sybil devices at scale, creating armies of virtual vehicles capable of remotely tracking precise movements for large user populations while avoiding detection. To defend against Sybil devices, a new approach is developed based on co-location edges, authenticated records that attest to the one-time physical colocation of a pair of devices. Over time, co-location edges combine to form large proximity graphs that attest to physical interactions between devices, allowing scalable detection of virtual vehicles. It demonstrate the efficiency of this approach using large-scale simulations, and how they can be used to dramatically reduce the impact of the attacks.

Existing System

The popularity of online social networks (OSNs) has resulted in them being targeted with Sybil attacks. Several schemes have been proposed to defend against Sybil attacks. In this existing system, we present Sybil Exposer, an efficient and effective Sybil community detection algorithm. It relies on the properties of social graph communities to rank communities according to their perceived likelihood of being fake or Sybil.

Proposed System

Real-time crowdsourced maps, such as website provide timely updates on traffic, congestion, accidents, and points of interest. In the proposed system a new privacy attacks are occurred. It allows ghost riders to virtually follow and track individual users. Proximity graphs are propose and evaluate defenses against ghost riders, with edges representing authenticated collocation events between pairs of devices. Since collocation can only occur between pairs of physical devices, proximity graphs limit the number of edges between real devices and ghost riders.

Architecture

Architecture Diagram