Secure Mining of Associated rule in Horizontally Distributed Databases

Abstract

We propose a protocol for secure mining of association rules in horizontally distributed databases. The current leading protocol is that of Kantarcioglu and Clifton. Our protocol, like theirs, is based on the Fast Distributed Mining (FDM) algorithm of Cheung et al. which is an unsecured distributed version of the Apriori algorithm. The main ingredients in our protocol are two novel secure multi-party algorithms one that computes the union of private subsets that each of the interacting players hold, and another that tests the inclusion of an element held by one player in a subset held by another. Our protocol offers enhanced privacy with respect to the protocol. In addition, it is simpler and is significantly more efficient in terms of communication rounds, communication cost and computational cost.

Existing System

Kantarcioglu and Clifton studied that problems and devised a protocol for its solution. The main part of the protocol is a sub-protocol for the secure computation of the union of private subsets that are held by the different players. The private subset of a given player, as we explain below, includes the item sets that are s- frequent in his partial database. That is the most costly part of the protocol and its implementation relies upon cryptographic primitives such as commutative encryption, oblivious transfer, and hash functions. This is also the only part in the protocol in which the players may extract from their view of the protocol information on other databases, beyond what is implied by the final output and their own input. While such leakage of information renders the protocol not perfectly secure, the perimeter of the excess information is explicitly bounded and it is argued there that such information leakage is innocuous, whence acceptable from a practical point of view.

Proposed System

The protocol that we propose here computes a parameterized family of functions, which we call threshold functions, in which the two extreme cases correspond to the problems of computing the union and intersection of private subsets. Those are in fact general-purpose protocols that can be used in other contexts as well. Another problem of secure multiparty computation that we solve here as part of our discussion is the set inclusion problem; namely, the problem where Alice holds a private subset of some ground set, and Bob holds an element in the ground set, and they wish to determine whether Bob’s element is within Alice’s subset, without revealing to either of them information about the other party’s input beyond the above described inclusion.

Architecture